Missing the Forest for a Tree: Unpublished Opinions and New Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32.1 by Gant, Scott E
Boston College Law Review
Volume 47
Issue 4 Number 4 Article 2
7-1-2006
Missing the Forest for a Tree: Unpublished
Opinions and New Federal Rule of Appellate
Procedure 32.1
Scott E. Gant
Follow this and additional works at: http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr
Part of the Courts Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Boston College Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. For more information, please
contact nick.szydlowski@bc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Scott E. Gant, Missing the Forest for a Tree: Unpublished Opinions and New Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32.1, 47 B.C.L. Rev. 705
(2006), http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr/vol47/iss4/2
MISSING THE FOREST FOR A TREE:
UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS AND
NEW FEDERAL RULE OF
APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1
Scull' E. GANT*
Abstract On December 1, 2006, Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure
32.1 will take effect, allowing citation to all opinions issued on or after
January 1, 2007 that have been designated "unpublished" or "non-
precedential." The new Rule, under consideration by the judicial Con-
ference of the United States since the 1990s, seemingly puts an end to
the long and sometimes contentious debate over whether citation to
unpublished opinions should be permitted. But the Rule does not ad-
dress a more important issue: whether the federal courts of appeals
should designate some of their opinions as nonprecedential. This Arti-
cle argues the notion that judges can and should determine an opin-
ion's precedential value at the time they issue it is based upon a flawed
and outdated view of how the law develops. Whether an opinion has
made "new law" or is otherwise significant is a judgment best made with
the benefit of time, and with input from lawyers, litigants, and other
judges.
INTRODUCTION
On December 1, 2006, new Federal Rule of Appellate Proce-
dure 32.1 will take effect, displacing the array of rules in the indi-
vidual federal appeals courts governing citation to "unpublished"
opinions and other case dispositions designated as nonprecedential,
and imposing in their place a uniform rule allowing citation to such
decisions.' The Rule's enactment (in which both Chief Justice Rob-
erts and Justice Alito played significant roles) follows several years of
vigorous debate not ordinarily associated with consideration of a
*	 2006, Scott E. Gant. All rights reserved. B.A. 1991, Wesleyan University; J.D.
1095, Harvard Law School.
I FED. IL APP. P. 32.1 (proposed); see Order Amending the Fed. Rules of Appellate Pro-
cedure (2006) [hereinafter Order], available at http://www.suprernecourtus.gov/orders/
courtorders/frap06p.pclf.
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rule of procedure, let alone the typically quiet rulemaking process
for the federal courts of appeals.2
Unfortunately, the furor over the new citation rule has over-
shadowed a more important and divisive issue—whether it is appro-
priate for appeals courts to designate some (in fact, most) of their
decisions as nonprecedentia1. 5 The sponsors of Rule 32.1 were aware
of the controversy that has emerged during the past decade regard-
ing the wisdom and constitutionality of this practice, but they
steered clear of it, emphasizing early on that the Rule is "extremely
limited" and avoids taking any position on this highly-charged ques-
tion.4
Supporters of unpublished opinions principally contend that
the opinions enable appeals courts to conserve and sensibly allocate
scarce judicial resources, and promote clarity, uniformity, and cohe-
siveness of the law. Critics of unpublished opinions charge that they
permit appeals courts to suppress precedent, lead to the dedication
of insufficient attention to unpublished dispositions, and are incon-
sistent with principles of judicial accountability. 5 These arguments
2 See infra notes 67-100 and accompanying text.
3 District courts are not faced with the challenge of deciding which, if any, of their
opinions should be designated as unpublished because, as a formal matter, no district
court opinions are "precedential." See Colby v. J.C. Penney Co„ 811 F.2d 1119, 1124 (7th
Cir. 1987) (ID] istrict judges in this circuit must not treat decisions by other district judges,
in this and a fortiori in other circuits, as controlling, unless of course the doctrine of res
judicata or of collateral estoppel applies.... [T]he responsibility for maintaining the
law's uniformity is a responsibility of appellate rather than trial judges ...."); Nat'l Un-
ion Fire Ins. Co. v. Allfirst Bank, 282 F. Stipp. 2d 339, 351 (D. Md. 2003) ("Of course, no
decision of a district court judge is technically binding on another district court judge,
even within the same district.") (citation omitted); In re Oxford Health Plans, Inc„ 191
F.R.D. 369, 377 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) ("Principles of stare decisis do not require this Court to
give any deference to decisions of another district judge.") (citation omitted).
4 FED. R. Mn',P P. 32.1 (proposed) advisory committee's note ("Rule 32.1 is extremely
limited. It takes no position on whether refusing to treat an 'unpublished' opinion as
binding precedent is constitutional. It does not require any court to issue an 'unpub-
lished' opinion or forbid any court from doing so. It does not dictate the circumstances
under which a court may choose to designate an opinion as 'unpublished' or specify the
procedure that a court must follow in making that decision. It says nothing about what
effect a court must give to one of its 'unpublished' opinions or to the 'unpublished'
opinions of another court.") (citations omitted); Letter from Seth P. Waxman, U.S. So-
licitor General, to Judge Will Garwood, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit 1
(Jan. 16, 2001) (on file with author) ("Although this is a sensitive topic, I believe that
[proposed Rule 32.1] is narrowly framed and focused solely on citation rules that, by
their nature, are an appropriate topic for national rule-making.").
5 Most of the arguments for and against unpublished opinions are well covered in
other articles and will not be repeated here. See generally Richard S. Arnold, Unpublished
Opinions: A Comment, 11 APP. Pi c. & PROCESS 219 (1999); Stephen R. Barnett, From
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were featured in the wrangling over whether to enact a uniform rule
governing citation to unpublished opinions, which culminated in
adoption of the new Rule.°
What has been missing from the debate over unpublished opin-
ions, however, is an examination of its conceptual foundation. Un-
derpinning the practice of designating certain opinions "unpub-
lished" is the notion that appeals court judges themselves can and
should determine an opinion's precedential authority at the time they
issue the opinion, based on their view about whether that opinion has
made "new law" or is otherwise significant.? That idea is predicated
upon a flawed and outdated view of judicial decisionmaking and de-
velopment of the law, and should be abandoned. 8
 Stripped of its
anachronistic foundation, it becomes difficult to justify the existing
Anastasoff to Hart to West's Federal Appendix: The Ground Shifts Under No-Citation Rules, 4
J, Arr. PRAC. & PROCESS 1 (2002); Douglas A. Berman & Jeffrey 0. Cooper, In Defense of
Less Precedential Opinions: A Reply to Chief Judge Martin, 60 Onto ST. L.J. 2025 (1999);
Danny J. Boggs & Brian P. Brooks, Unpublished Opinions &' the Nature of Precedent, 4 GREEN
BAG 20 17 (2000); Richard B. Cappalli, The Common Law's Case Against Non-Precedential
Opinions, 76 S. CAL. L. REV. 755 (2003); Charles E. Carpenter, Jr, The No-Citation Rule for
Unpublished Opinions: Do the Ends of Expediency for Overloaded Appellate Courts Justify the
Means of Secrecy?, 50 S.C. L. REV. 235 (1998); Jeffrey 0. Cooper, Citability and the Nature of
Precedent in the Courts of Appeals: A Response to Dean Robe!, 35 IND. L. REV. 423 (2002); Dan-
iel N. Hoffman, Publicity and the Judicial Power, 3 J. APP. I'RAc. & PROCESS 343 (2001);
Salem M. Katsh & Alex V. Chachkes, Constitutionality of "No-Citation" Rules, 3J. App. BRAC.
& PROCESS 287 (2001); Thomas R. Lee & Lance S. Lehnhof, The Anastasoff Case and the
Judicial Power to "Unpublish" Opinions, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 135 (2001); Lauren Robe',
The Practice Precedent: Anastasoff, Noncitation Rules, and the Meaning of Precedent in an
Interpretive Community, 35 INn. L. REV. 399 (2002); David S. Tatel, Some Thoughts on Unpub-
lished Decisions, 64 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 815 (1996); Carl Tobias, Anastasoff, Unpublished
Opinions, and Federal Appellate Justice, 25 HARI!, J.L. & Pun. POCY 1171 (2002); Melissa H.
Weresh, The Unpublished, Non-Precedential Decision: An Uncomfortable Legality?, 3 J. Arr.
l'RAC. & PROCESS 175 (2001); Elizabeth M. Horton, Comment, Selective Publication and the
Authority of Precedent in the United States Courts of Appeals, 42 UCLA L. REV. 1691 (1995);
Kenneth Anthony Laretto, Note, Precedent, Judicial Power, and the Constitutionality of "No-
Citation" Rules in the Federal Courts of Appeals, 54 STAN. L. REV. 1037 (2002); Kirt Shuld-
berg, Comment, Digital Influence: Technology and Unpublished Opinions in the Federal Courts
of Appeals, 85 CAL. L. REv. 541 (1997); Suzanne 0. Snowden, Note, "That's My Holding
and I'm Not Sticking to It!" Court Rules That Deprive Unpublished Opinions of Precedential
Authority Distort the Common Law, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 1253 (2001); Jon A. Strongman,
Comment, Unpublished Opinions, Precedent, and the Fifth Amendment: Why Denying Unpub-
lished Opinions Precedential Value Is Unconstitutional, 50 U. KAN. L. REV. 195 (2001).
6 See Patrick]. Schiltz, The Citation of Unpublished Opinions in the Federal Courts of Ap-
peals, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 23, 30-57 (2005) (summarizing arguments advanced for and
against Rule 32.1 during the rulemaking process).
7 See infra notes 101-26 and accompanying text.
8 See infra notes 127-30 and accompanying text.
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system of unpublished opinions, which is desperately in need of re-
consideration.
I. UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS AND PUBLICATION RULES
A. The History of Unpublished Opinions
Today the designation of an opinion as "unpublished" refers to
its status as nonprecedential. But when the rules regarding unpub-
lished opinions emerged several decades ago, the designation of a
decision as published or unpublished actually bore some relation-
ship to its availability to lawyers and the public, as the label would
suggest.
Commentators expressed concerns about the growing number
of judicial opinions as early as the 1800s. 9 The movement towards
formal limitations on the publication of, and citation to, appellate
rulings did not emerge until 1964, however, when the Judicial Con-
ference of the United Statesm (the "Judicial Conference") resolved
that courts of appeals should publish "only those opinions which arc
of general precedential value."ll Seven years later, in 1971, the Fed-
eral Judicial Center (the "FJC") 12 observed in its annual report there
was "widespread consensus that too many opinions are being
printed or published or otherwise disseminated." 13 The following
9 See Roberti Martineau, Restrictions an Publication and Citation of Judicial Opinions: A
Reassessment, 28 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 119, 121 & n.3 (1994). Some American commen-
tators voiced concerns about the proliferation of judicial decisions as early as the first
half of the nineteenth century, and British commentators voiced concerns as early as the
late 1700s. See David Greenwald & Frederick A. 0. Schwarz, Jr., The Censorial judiciary, 35
U .C. DAMS L. REV. 1133, 1144-45 (2002).
'° The Judicial Conference was created by Congress to make policy with regard to
the administration of the U.S. courts. See 28 U.S.C. § 331 (2000 & Supp. III 2003). It is
comprised of the chief judge of each circuit, the chief judge of the Court of Interna-
tional Trade, and a district judge from each judicial circuit chosen by appellate and dis-
trict judges from that circuit, with the Chief justice of the United States as its presiding
officer. See id.
11 JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., REPORTS OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDI-
CIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 11 (1964).
12 The Federal Judicial Center is the research and education agency of the federal
judicial system. 28 U.S.C. § 620(b) (2000). It was established by Congress in 1967 on the
recommendation of the Judicial Conference of the United States. Act of Dec. 20, 1967,
Pub. L. No. 90-219, § 101, 81 Stat. 664, 664 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 620 (2000)). By stat-
ute, the ChiefJustice of the United States chairs the FJC's Board; other members include
the director of the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts and seven judges elected by
the Judicial Conference. 28 U.S.C. § 621 (2000).
13 FED. JUDICIAL CTR., ANNUAL REPORT 7-8 (1971).
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year, the FJC's Board recommended that the Judicial Conference
instruct the courts of appeals to adopt procedures for publishing
only some of their opinions and adopt rules limiting citation to un-
published opinions. 14 Heeding that recomtnendation, in October
1972 the Judicial Conference directed the courts of appeals to de-
velop their own plans for selective publication of opinions. 15 By 1974
each court had developed its own plan, and the courts implemented
them over the next several years. 16
Initially, opinions designated as unpublished were available to
anyone who wished to pay a visit to the clerk's office at each court of
appeals, but were not otherwise disseminated to the public or to le-
gal publishers. Over time, however, more and more "unpublished"
opinions became widely available, primarily through private pub-
lishers such as West and Lexis. 17 Today, most unpublished opinions
(which comprise approximately 80% of all appeals court disposi-
tions) 18
 are accessible through electronic legal databases, or in
14 See JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDI-
CIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 33 (1972); see also William L. Reynolds & Wil-
liam M. Richman, The Non-Precedential Precedent—Limited Publication and No-Citation Rules
in the United States Courts of Appeals, 78 Cotum. L. REV. 1167, 1170 (1978) (discussing the
FJC Board's recommendation).
15 See Juntom. CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., REPORT OE THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE Joni-
CIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 33 (1972). In 1973, the Advisory Council for
Appellate Justice issued a report urging appellate courts to adopt publication rules to
reduce the number of published opinions. See Comm. ON USE OF APPELLATE COURT EN-
ERGIES OF THE ADVISORY COUNCIL ON APPELLATE JUSTICE, STANDARDS FOR PUBLICATION
OF JUDICIAL OPINIONS 5 (1973). The Council was jointly sponsored by the Federal Judi-
cial Center and the National Center for State Courts. See Martineau, supra note 9, at 122
n.5.
Is See Greenwald & Schwarz, supra note 9, at 1142; Penelope Pether, Inequitable In-
junctions: The Scandal of Private Judging in the U.S. Courts, 56 STAN. L. Ray. 1435, 1443-44
(2004); Reynolds & Richman, supra note 14, at 1171; see also Fan. R. APP. P. 47(a)
(authorizing courts of appeals to enact local rules).
17 See Robert C. Berring, Legal Research and Legal Concepts: Where Form Molds Substance,
75 CAL. L. REV. 15, 17-20 (1987) (discussing the history of reporting on judicial deci-
sions); William R. Mills, 7'he Shape of the Universe: The Impact of Unpublished Opinions on the
Process of Legal Research, 46 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 429, 440 (2002-03) (noting that "[c]ourts'
limited publication regimes have never completely prevented researchers from finding
unpublished opinions, any more than their no-cite rules have prevented lawyers and
judges from using them"). See generally Francine Biscardi, The Historical Development of the
Law Concerning Judicial Report Publication, 85 LAW LIAR. J. 531 (1993) (discussing the
history of judicial opinion compilation and publication).
18 ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE U.S. COURTS 42
thl.S-3 (2005), available at littp://www.uscourts.gov/judbits2005/tables/s3.pdf (showing
that approximately 82% of dispositions on tthe merits during time 12-month period end-
ing September 30, 2005 were "unpublished"). The Administrative Office of the U.S.
Courts compiles annual statistics on the operation of the federal courts, including data
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West's Federal Appendix, established in 2001, which includes every
"unpublished" decision sent to it by courts of appeals. 1° Moreover,
the E-Government Act of 2002 requires that all opinions, published
and unpublished, be posted on every federal court's own website. 2°
B, Publication and Citation Rules in the U.S. Courts of Appeals
For the past three decades, each federal appeals court has main-
tained, and occasionally revised, its own rules governing publication
and citation. 21 Among them, only the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
D.C. Circuit has dispensed with the practice of designating some of its
dispositions as nonprecedentia1. 22 Although that court retains the dis-
tinction between "published" and "unpublished" opinions, both
forms of opinions rendered after January 1, 2002 may be cited "as
precedent."23 Each of the other courts of appeals currently has rules
under which it relegates certain dispositions to nonprecedential
status. 24
on the types of opinions or orders entered in cases terminated on the merits in the
courts of appeals. See id.; see also Michael Hannon, A Closer Look at Unpublished Opinions in
the United States Courts of Appeals, 31 APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 199, 200-05 (2001) (tracing
the rise in unpublished opinions in the federal appeals courts using statistics from the
Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts).
12 See 1 WEST'S FEDERAL APPENDIX, at iii (2001).
E-Government Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-347, § 205(a) (5), 116 Stat. 2899,
2913.
21 See supra notes 15-16 and accompanying text.
22 See D.C. Cut. R. 28(c) (1)(B).
25 Id. But see D.C. Cm. R. 36(c) (2) ("While unpublished orders and judgments may
be cited to the court in accordance with Circuit Rule 28(c) (1) (B), a panel's decision to
issue an unpublished disposition means that the panel sees no precedential value in that
disposition.").
24 See, e.g., 1ST CIR. R. 36(a) ("[W] here opinions are likely not to break new legal
ground or contribute otherwise to legal development, they are issued in unpublished
form."); 1ST Cut. R. 36(b) (1) ("ln general, the court thinks it desirable that opinions be
published and thus be available for citation. The policy may be overcome in sonic situa-
tions where an opinion does not articulate a new rule of law, modify an established rule,
apply an established rule to novel facts or serve otherwise as a significant guide to future
litigants."); 2D CIR. R. § 0.23 ("[W]hen no jurisprudential purpose would be served by a
written opinion, disposition will be made in open court or by summary order.... Where
disposition is by summary order, the court may append a brief written statement to that
order.... [But) these statements do not constitute formal opinions of the court ....");
4TH Cm. R. 36(a) ("Opinions delivered by the Court will be published only if the opin-
ion satisfies one or more of the standards for publication: (i) It establishes, alters,
modifies, clarifies, or explains a rule of law within this Circuit; or (ii) It involves a legal
issue of continuing public interest; or (iii) It criticizes existing law; or (iv) It contains a
historical review of a legal rule that is not duplicative; or (v) It resolves a conflict be-
tween panels of this Court, or creates a conflict with a decision in another circuit"); 5TH
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CIR. R. 47.5.1 ('The publication of opinions that merely decide particular cases on the
basis of well-settled principles of law imposes needless expense on the public and bur-
dens on the legal profession. However, opinions that may in any way interest persons
other than the parties to a case should be published. Therefore, an opinion is published
if it: (a) Establishes a new rule of law, alters, or modifies an existing rule of law, or calls
attention to an existing rule of law that appears to have been generally overlooked; (b)
Applies an established rule of law to facts significantly different from those in previous
published opinions applying the rule; (c) Explains, criticizes, or reviews the history of
existing decisional or enacted law; (d) Creates or resolves a conflict of authority either
within the circuit or between this circuit arid another; (e) Concerns or discusses a factual
or legal issue of significant public interest; or (f) Is rendered in a case that has been
reviewed previously and its merits addressed by an opinion of the United States Supreme
Court. An opinion may also he published if it: Is accompanied by a concurring or dis-
senting opinion; or reverses the decision below or affirms it upon different grounds.");
fiTH CIR. R. 206(a) ('The following criteria shall be considered by panels in determining
whether a decision will be designated for publication ... : (1) whether it establishes a
new rule of law, or alters or modifies an existing rule of law, or applies an established
rule to a novel fact situation; (2) whether it creates or resolves a conflict or [sic) author-
ity either within the circuit or between this circuit and another; (3) whether it discusses a
legal or factual issue of continuing public interest; (4) whether it is accompanied by a
concurring or dissenting opinion; (5) whether it reverses the decision below ... ; (6)
whether it addresses a lower court or administrative agency decision that has been pub-
lished; or (7) whether it is a decision that has been reviewed by the United States Su-
preme Court."); 7TH CIR. R. 53(c) (1) ("A published opinion will be filed when the deci-
sion (i) establishes a new, or changes an existing rule of law; (ii) involves an issue of
continuing public interest; (iii) criticizes or questions existing law; (iv) constitutes a
significant and non-duplicative contribution to legal literature (A) by a historical review
of law, (B) by describing legislative history, or (C) by resolving or creating a conflict in
the law; (v) reverses a judgment or denies enforcement of an order when the lower
court or agency has published an opinion supporting the judgment or order; or (vi) is
pursuant to an order of remand from the Supreme Court and is not rendered merely in
ministerial obedience to specific directions of that Court."); 7Tu Cnt. R. 53(c) (2)
("When the decision does not satisfy the criteria for publication as set out in Seventh
Circuit Rule 53(c)(I)J it will be filed as an unpublished order."); 9Th Cut, R. 36-2 ("A
written, reasoned disposition shall be designated as an OPINION only if it: (a) Estab-
lishes, alters, modifies or clarifies a rule of law, or (b) Calls attention to a rule of law
which appears to have been generally overlooked, or (c) Criticizes existing law, or (c1)
Involves a legal or factual issue of unique interest or substantial public importance, or
(e) Is a disposition of a case in which there is a published opinion by a lower court or
administrative agency, unless the panel determines that publication is unnecessary for
clarifying the panel's disposition of the case, or (f) Is a disposition of a case following a
reversal or remand by the United States Supreme Court, or (g) Is accompanied by a
separate concurring or dissenting expression, and the author of such separate expres-
sion requests publication of the disposition of the Court and the separate expression.");
11TH CIR. R. 36-3, I.O.P. 6 ("Opinions that the panel believes to have no precedential
value are not published."); D.C. Cut. R. 36(a) (2) ("An opinion, memorandum, or other
statement explaining the basis for the court's action in issuing an order or judgment will
be published if it meets one or more of the following criteria: (A) with regard to a sub-
stantial issue it resolves, it is a case of first impression or the first case to present the issue
in this court; (B) it alters, modifies, or significantly clarifies a rule of law previously an-
nounced by the court; (C) it calls attention to an existing rule of law that appears to
have been generally overlooked; (D) it criticizes or questions existing law; (E) it resolves
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Some courts have dispensed with the term "unpublished" and
simply refer to decisions as precedential or nonprecedential. 25 Oth-
ers specifically address the precedential or binding effect of an un-
published opinion. 26 The Eighth and Tenth Circuits have no criteria
an apparent conflict in decisions within the circuit or creates a conflict with another
circuit; (F) it reverses a published agency or district court decision, or affirms a decision
of the district court upon grounds different from those set forth in the district court's
published opinion; (C) it warrants publication in light of other factors that give it gen-
eral public interest."). See generally Stephen L. Wasby, Publication (or Not) of Appellate Rul-
ings: An Evaluation of Guidelines, 2 Se-roN HALL CIR. Rev. 41 (2005) (discussing non pub-
lication rules and norms, and bow judges enforce them).
23 See 3u Cut. INTERNAL OPERATING P. 5.2 ("An opinion, whether signed or per cu-
dam, is designated as precedential ... when it has precedential or institutional value.");
3D CIR. INTERNAL OPERATING P. 5.3 ("An opinion, whether signed or per curiam, that
appears to have value only to the trial court or the parties is designated as not precede:I-
da! .... A not precedential opinion may be issued without regard to whether the panel's
decision is unanimous and without regard to whether the panel affirms, reverses, or
grants other relief."); FED. CIR. R. 47.6(b) ("An opinion or order which is designated as
not to be cited as precedent is one determined by the panel issuing it as nut adding
significantly to the body of law."); Fen. CIR. INTERNAL OPERATING P. 10.3 ("Disposition
by nonprecedential opinion or order [means] that a precedential opinion would not
add significantly to the body of law . . . ."); Fen. CIR. INTERNAL OPERATING P. 10.4 Mlle
court's policy is to limit precedent to dispositions meeting one or more of these criteria:
(a) The case is a test case. (b) Au issue of first impression is treated. (c) A new rule of
law is established. (d) An existing rule of law is criticized, clarified, altered, or modified.
(e) An existing rule of law is applied to facts significantly different from those to which
that rule has previously been applied. (f) An actual or apparent conflict in or with past
holdings of this court or other courts is created, resolved, or continued. (g) A legal issue
of substantial public interest, which the court has not sufficiently treated recently, is re-
solved. (h) A significantly new factual situation, likely to be of interest to a wide spec-
trum of persons other than the parties to a case, is set forth. (i) A new interpretation of a
Supreme Court decision, or of a statute, is set forth. (j) A new constitutional or statutory
issue is treated. (k) A previously overlooked rule of law is treated. (l) Procedural errors,
or errors in the conduct of the judicial process, are corrected, whether by remand with
instructions or otherwise. (in) The case has been returned by the U.S. Supreme Court
for disposition by action of this court other than ministerial obedience to directions of
the Court. (n) A panel desires to adopt as precedent in this court an opinion of a lower
tribunal, in whole or in part.").
26 See 1ST CIR. R. 36(c) ("[A] panel's decision to issue an unpublished opinion
means that the panel sees no precedential value in that opinion."); 5TH Cm. R. 47.5.4
("All unpublished opinions issued on or alter January 1, 1996 are not precedent, except
under the doctrine of res judicata, collateral estoppel or law of the case ...."); 61'Ei CIR.
R. 206(c) ("Published Opinions Binding. Reported panel opinions are binding on sub-
sequent panels."); 8TH Cm. R. 28A(i) ("[Unpublished opinions] are not precedent
...."); 9TH CIR. R. 36-3(a) ("Unpublished dispositions and orders of this Court are not
binding precedent, except when relevant under the doctrine of law of the case, res judi-
cata, and collateral estoppel."); 10TH Cut. R. 36.3(A) ("Unpublished orders and judg-
ments of this court are not binding precedents, except under the doctrines of law of the
case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel."); 11TH Cm. R. 36-2 ("Unpublished opinions
are not considered binding precedent ... ."); D.C. CIR. R. 28(c) (1) (B) ("All unpub-
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for publication or assignment of precedential value, even though
they designate some opinions as unpublished and do not treat those
opinions as precedential."
Many of the courts' citation rules address only citation of un-
published decisions to that court, 28 or do not specify the reach of
their rule.29 Some courts also address citation of their unpublished
decisions to other courts," and/or by other courts.31 A few courts
fished orders or judgments of this court.... entered on or after January 1, 2002 may be
cited as precedent.").
27 See 8TH CIR. INTERNAL OPERATING P.W.B; 10TH CIR. R. 36.1; 10TH Cm. R. 36.2.
28 E.g., 1sT CIR. R. 32.3(a) ("An unpublished opinion of this court may be cited in
this court only in the following circumstances ....").
29 See 3o Cut. R. 28.3 ("Citations to federal decisions that have not been formally re-
ported shall identify the court, docket number and date, and refer to the electronically
transmitted decision."); 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4 ("An unpublished opinion may ... be persua-
sive [and can be cited]."); 8TH CIR. It 28A(i) ("[Unpublished opinions] are not precedent
and parties generally should riot cite them. When relevant to establishing the doctrines of
res judicata, collateral estoppel, or the law of the case, however, the parties may cite any
unpublished opinion. Parties may also cite an unpublished opinion of this court if the
opinion has persuasive value on a material issue and no published opinion of this or an-
other court would serve as well."); lOrmi CIR. R. 36.3(B) ("Citation of an unpublished deci-
sion is disfavored. But an unpublished decision may be cited if: (1) it has persuasive value
with respect to a material issue diet has not been addressed in a published opinion; and
(2) it would assist the court in its disposition,"); 11TH CIR. R. 36-2 ("Unpublished opinions
... may be cited as persuasive authority."); D.C. CIR. R. 28(c) (1) (B) ("All unpublished
orders or judgments of this court entered on or after January 1, 2002, may be cited as
precedent."); FED. CIR. It 47.6(b) ("Any opinion or order [designated as nonprecedential]
must not be employed or cited as precedent. [But this rule does not preclude assertion of
claim preclusion, issue preclusion, judicial estoppel, law of the case, or the like ....").
80 See 2n CIR. R. § 0.23 ("Where disposition is by summary order, the court may ap-
pend a brief written statement to that order. Since these statements do not constitute
formal opinions of the court and are unreported or not uniformly available to all par-
ties, they shall not be cited or otherwise used in unrelated cases before this or any other
court.") (emphasis added); 4TH CIR. R. 36(c) ("Citation of this Court's unpublished dis-
positions in briefs and oral arguments in this Court and in the district courts within this Cir-
cuit is disfavored, except for the purpose of establishing res judicata, estoppel, or the law
of the case. If counsel believes, nevertheless, that an unpublished disposition of this
Court has precedential value in relation to a material issue in a case and that there is no
published opinion that would serve as well, such disposition may be cited if counsel
serves a copy thereof on all other parties' in the case and on the Court.") (emphasis
added); 6TH CIR. IL 28(g) ("Citation of unpublished decisions in briefs and oral argu-
ments in this Court and in the district courts Within this Circuit is disfavored, except for time
purpose of establishing res judicata, estoppel, or the law of the case.") (emphasis
added); 7TH CIR. R. 53(b) (2) ("Unpublished orders: (iv) Except to support a claim
of res judicata, collateral estoppel or law of the case, shall not be cited or used as prece-
dent (A) in any federal court within the circuit in any written document or in oral ar-
gument ...."). The authority of a court to prohibit citation of one of its decisions to a
court in another circuit is unclear.
81 See 7TH CM. R. 53(b) (2) ("Unpublished orders: • • . (iv) Except to support a claim
of res judicata, collateral estoppel or law of the case, shall not be cited or used as prece-
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also have rules governing citation of other courts' unpublished or
nonprecedential opinions." Others have rules or internal operating
procedures describing their own citation of unpublished opinions. 33
Most describe their procedures for determining the publication
status of an opinion.34
dent ... (B) by any [federal court within the circuit] for any purpose."); grit CIR. R. 36-
3(b) ("Unpublished dispositions and order [sic] of this Court may not be cited to or by
the courts of this circuit except (I) [W]hen relevant under the doctrine [sic] of law of
the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel. (2) [F]or factual purposes .... [O]r (3) in a
request to publish a disposition or in a petition for panel rehearing or rehearing en
bane . .") (emphasis added). The Ninth Circuit has criticized at least one district court
in its circuit for citing an unpublished opinion. See Thomas v. Newton Intl Enters., 42
F.3d 1266, 1272 (9th Cir. 1994) (observing that the district court "violated" the Ninth
Circuit rule by citing extensively to an unpublished opinion, and reminding "the parties
and the district court that the terms of Circuit Rule 36-3 must be strictly followed").
32 See 1ST CIR. R. 32.3(h) ("Unpublished or non-precedential opinions of other courts
as defined or understood by those courts, may be cited [according to the First Circuit
Rules].") (emphasis added); 7TH CIR. R. 53(e) ("Except to [sic] the purposes set forth
in Circuit Rule 53(b) (2) (iv) [to support a claim of res judicata, collateral estoppel or law
of the case], no unpublished opinion or order of any court may be cited in the Seventh
Circuit if citation is prohibited in the rendering court.") (emphasis added); D.C. Cm. R.
28(c) (2) ("Unpublished dispositions of other courts of appeals and district courts may be
cited when the binding ... or preclusive effect of the disposition is relevant. Otherwise,
unpublished opinions by other courts of appeals may be cited only under the circum-
stances and for the purposes permitted by the court issuing the disposition ....") (em-
phasis added).
35 See 3o CIR. INTERNAL. OPERATING P. 5.7 ('The court by tradition does not cite to
its not precedential opinions as authority. Such opinions are not regarded as precedents
that bind the court because they do not circulate to the full court before filing."); 4TH
CIR. R. 36(c) (In the absence of unusual circumstances, this Court will not cite an un-
published disposition in any of its published opinions or unpublished dispositions.").
m See 1ST CIR. R. 36(b) (2) (C) ("When a panel decides a case with a dissent, or with
more than one opinion, the opinion or opinions shall be published unless all the par-
ticipating judges decide against publication. In any case decided by the court en bane
the opinion or opinions shall be published."); 3D CIR. INTERNAL OPERATING P. 5.1 ("A
majority of the panel determines whether an opinion is designated as precedential or
not precedential, unless a majority of the active judges of the court decides otherwise.");
4TH CIR. R. 36(a) ("Opinions ... will be published if the author or a majority of the
joining judges believes the opinion satisfies one or more of the standards for publica-
tion, and all members of the Court have acknowledged in writing their receipt of the
proposed opinion. A judge may file a published opinion without obtaining all acknow-
ledgements only if the opinion has been in circulation for ten calendar days."); 5TH CIR.
R. 47.5.2 ("An opinion shall be published unless each member of the panel deciding the
case determines that its publication is neither required nor justified under the criteria
for publication."); 6TH Cm. R. 206(b) ("An opinion or order shall be designated for
publication upon the request of any member of the panel."); 7TH CIR. R. 53(d)(1)
("The determination to dispose of an appeal by unpublished order shall be made by a
majority of the panel rendering the decision."); 8TH CIR. INTERNAL. OPERATING P. IV.B
("The panel determines whether the opinion is to be published or unpublished."); 9TH
CIR. R. 36-5 ("An order may be specially designated for publication by a majority of the
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II. ANASTASOFF V. UNITED STATES: A SHOT ACROSS THE Bow
Much of the current debate over unpublished opinions can be
traced to an Eighth Circuit decision issued in August 2000. 35 In
Anastasoff v. United States, the court considered an appeal by a tax-
payer whose claim for a refund of overpaid taxes had been deemed
untimely by the district court. 36 Ms. Anastasoff argued to the Eighth
Circuit panel that it was not bound by one of the court's prior un-
published decisions, in which it had considered and rejected the
"same legal argument" advanced in her case. 37 In response, the
panel issued a (published) opinion, authored by judge Richard
Arnold, which deemed unconstitutional the portion of the Eighth
Circuit's rule declaring unpublished opinions nonprecedentia1. 38
Focusing on Article III of the Constitution—in particular, its refer-
ence to the "judicial powee 39—the panel concluded that the court's
rule "expands the judicial power beyond the limits set by Article III
by allowing us complete discretion to determine which judicial deci-
sions will bind us and which will not. Insofar as it limits the prece-
dential effect of our prior decisions, the Rule is therefore unconsti-
tutional."4° The panel accordingly viewed itself bound by the court's
prior unpublished opinion on the issue, ruling against Ms. Anasta-
soff by finding her refund claim untimely.'"
While the Eighth Circuit was deciding Anastasoff, the Second
Circuit issued an opinion reaching the opposite conclusion about
the underlying legal question. 42 In light of this conflict, as well as
her view that the panel's constitutional ruling regarding unpub-
judges acting and when so published may he used for any purpose for which an opinion
may be used."); 11Th Cllr. R. 36-2 ("An opinion shall be unpublished unless a majority
of the panel decides to publish it,"); D.C. Cut. R. 36(c) (2) ("LA] panel's decision to issue
an unpublished disposition means that the panel sees no precedential value in that dis-
position."); FED. CIR. INTERNAL OPERATING P. 10.5 ('The election to [issue a judgment
without opinion] shall be unanimous among the judges of the panel.").
33 See, e.g., Barnett, supra note 5, at 1, 8; Lee & Lehnbof, supra note 5, at 135-38; Ro-
bel, supra note 5, at 409-11.
36 223 F.3d 898, 899 (8th Cir.), vacated as moot on reh'g, 235 F.3d 1054 (8th Cir. 2000)
(en bane).
37 Id.
36
 Id.; seet3TH Cm. R. 28A(i).
39 U.S. CONST. art. Ill, § 1, cl. 1.
4° Anastasoff, 223 F.3d at 905.
41 See id. at 899, 905. One year before Anastasoff, Judge Arnold had posed the same
question presented by the case in an article. See Arnold, supra note 5, at 226 (asking, but
not examining, whether "the assertion dint unpublished opinions are not precedent and
cannot be cited Us] a violation of Article III").
42 See Weisbart v. U.S. Dep't of Treasury, 222 F.3d 93, 96-97 (2d Cir. 2000).
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lished opinions was erroneous, Ms. Anastasoff petitioned the Eighth
Circuit for rehearing en banc.43 The government responded to the
petition for rehearing en banc by informing the court that it in-
tended to pay Ms. Anastasoff in full, and contending that the appeal
should be dismissed as moot." After learning that Ms. Anastasoff's
claim had been paid, in December 2000 the Eighth Circuit issued an
en banc decision finding that the case was moot. 45 The court's deci-
sion also explained that, in accordance with "the appropriate and
customary treatment" when a case becomes moot, the court would
vacate the panel's opinion and judgment in the case.46 As for its rule
on unpublished opinions, the en banc court observed: "The consti-
tutionality of that portion of [our rule] which says that unpublished
opinions have no precedential effect remains an open question in
this Circuit."47
Although the Eighth Circuit pulled back its ruling on the con-
stitutionality of unpublished opinions, its effects have lingered, and
the panel's decision prompted responses from two other circuit
courts. In 2001, the Ninth Circuit ordered an attorney to show cause
why he should not be sanctioned for violating the court's rule bar-
ring citation of unpublished opinions.48 Although the court ulti-
mately exercised its discretion not to sanction the lawyer, it exten-
sively refuted the Anastasoff panel's conclusion that declaring some
decisions nonprecedential violates Article III. 49 Writing for the
court, Judge Alex Kozinski, one of the most ardent defenders of un-
published opinions, explained:
[W]e are unable to find within Article III of the Constitu-
tion a requirement that all case dispositions and orders is-
sued by appellate courts be binding authority. On the con-
" Anastasoff v. United States, 235 F.3d 1054, 1055 (8th Cir. 2000) (en bane).
44 Id.
45 Id. at 1056.
46
	 id.
47 Id. The court continues to leave undecided whether its rule prohibiting the use of
unpublished opinions for precedential value is constitutional. See Lederman v. Cragun's
Pine Beach Resort, 247•F.3d 812, 81611.3 (8th Cir. 2001).
41/ Hart v. Massanari, 266 F.3d 1155, 1159 (9th Cir. 2001); see 9TH CiR. R. 36-3.
49 Hari, 266 F.3d at 1175 ("The question raised by Anastasoff is whether one particu-
lar aspect of the binding authority principle—the decision of which rulings of an appel-
late court are binding—is a matter of judicial policy or constitutional imperative. We
believe Anastasoff erred in holding that, as a constitutional matter, courts of appeals may
not decide which of their opinions will be deemed binding on themselves and the courts
below them.").
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trary, we believe that an inherent aspect of our function as
Article III judges is managing precedent to develop a co-
herent body of circuit law to govern litigation in our court
and the other courts of this circuit.°
A few months later the Federal Circuit echoed the Ninth Circuit's
view when it rejected a party's contention that the court was bound
by two of its prior nonprecedential opinions under the reasoning of
Anastasoff. 51
Although several academic articles published since Anastasoff
have analyzed constitutional objections to unpublished opinions, 52
to date no other court of appeals has weighed in on the constitu-
tionality of unpublished opinions.55 Nonetheless, Anastasoff sparked
50 Id. at 1180. The Ninth Circuit also affirmed a district court decision dismissing a
lawsuit brought by a practicing attorney who contended that the Ninth Circuit's rules
prohibiting citation to unpublished opinions violated his constitutional rights, on the
grounds that the attorney lacked standing. See Schmier v. U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit, 279 F.3c1 817, 820-21 (9th Cir. 2002). Because all of the Ninth Circuit
judges recused themselves from the case, the panel was comprised of judges from other
courts. Id. at 819 n.". Although the court did not reach the merits of the constitutional
claim presented, it did note that "Nliven the wide range of interest shown in the debate
about unpublished opinions , we think it is only a matter of time before the theoreti-
cal questions raised by Schmier's complaint are all properly presented and resolved." Id.
at 825.
51 Symbol Teas., Inc. v. Lemelson Med., 277 F.3d 1361, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2002) ("Arti-
cle III of the Constitution does not contain an express prohibition on issuing non-
precedential opinions, nor can we discern one from the existence of the state of the law
when the Framers drafted it.").
52 See, e.g., Jessie Allen, Just Words? The Effects of No-Citation Rules in Federal Courts of
Appeals, 29 VT. L. Rev. 555, 574-91 (2005) (no-citation rules violate litigants' due process
rights); Greenwald & Schwarz, supra note 9, at 1161-66 (no-citation rules violate the
First Amendment guarantees of free speech and the right to petition); Hoffman, supra
note 5, at 347-52 (no-citation rules violate Article Ill); Katsh & Chachkes, supra note 5,
at 315-23 (no-citation rules violate separation of powers because they are not within
courts' Article III powers); Strongman, supra note 5, at 211-22 (no-citation rules violate
procedural due process and equal protection under the Fifth Amendment); Maria
Brooke Tusk, Note, No-Citations Rules as a Prior Restraint on Attorney Speech, 103 COMA'. L.
Rev. 1202, 1221-34 (2003) (no-citation rules violate the First Amendment's rule against.
prior restraints); Lance A. Wade, Note, Honda Meets Anastasoff: The Procedural Due Process
Argument Against Rules Prohibiting Citation to Unpublished Judicial Decisions, 42 B.C. L. REv.
695, 722-31 (2001) (no-citation rules violate procedural due process); see also Amy E.
Sloan, A Government of Laws and Not Men: Prohibiting Non-Precedential opinions by Statute or
Procedural Rule, 79 INn. L.J. 711, 745-65 (2004) (arguing that a national procedural rule
or federal statute prohibiting the federal appellate courts from prospectively designating
selected opinions as nonprecedential would be constitutional).
53
 Several judges in the Fifth Circuit did, however, urge that court to "revisit the
questionable practice of denying precedential status to unpublished opinions." See Wit-
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considerable debate over the wisdom and propriety of courts declar-
ing certain opinions nonprecedential, and about the rules regarding
citation to such opinions. 54
Hams v. Dallas Area Rapid Transit, 256 F.3(1260, 260 (5th Cir. 2001) (Smith, J., dissenting
from denial of rehearing en bane).
The Supreme Court has been presented with several petitions for certiorari raising
questions about the propriety of unpublished opinions and/or citation to them. See, e.g.,
Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, Lewin v. Cooke, 537 U.S. 881 (2002) (No. 02-49)
("When an appellant asserts that the circuit court's unpublished opinion in his case
disobeys this Court's controlling precedent, and that publication would help to deter the
disobedience, is there a due process right to publication?"); Petition for Writ of Certio-
rari at i, Culp v. flood, 519 U.S. 1042 (1996) (No. 96-696) ("Whether rules and customs
regarding the issuance by United States Courts of Appeal of unpublished decisions are
out of date and subject to abuse where computer retrieval of Courts of Appeal decisions
has alleviated the problems that the rules and customs regarding unpublished opinions
sought to correct."); see also Motion for Leave to File Petition for Writs of Mandamus and
Prohibition at 2, Do-Right Auto Sales v. U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit,
429 U.S. 917 (1976) (No. 75-1404) ("Whether Seventh Circuit Rule 28, which prohibits
the publication of written 'Orders' which set forth reasons for judgments, and further
prohibits a litigant from citing as precedent and relying upon such orders, denies due
process of law and violates First Amendment rights?"). The Court has denied these peti-
tions. See Lewin, 537 U.S. 881; Culp, 519 U.S. 1042; Do-Right Auto Sales, 429 U.S. 917; see
also Browder v. Director, Dep't of Corr. of Ill., 434 U.S. 257, 259 n.1 (1978) ("leavting
for] ... another day" petitioner's question about the validity of the Seventh Circuit's
"unpublished opinion" rule). Of course, one cannot infer anything about the Supreme
Court's views on unpublished opinions from its denial of certiorari in these cases. Never-
theless, that a court of appeals disposition was "published" has been cited by the Su-
preme Court as a factor in determining whether the disposition involved a "case" in the
courts of appeals, subject to review under 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1). See llohn v. United States,
524 U.S. 236, 242 (1998).
54 Although I take no position here regarding the constitutionality of unpublished
opinions, it is worth observing that the courts' practice of sorting out which of their
opinions will have precedential effect and which will not is somewhat incongruous with
(and tangential to) their constitutional assignment: the resolution of discrete cases and
controversies. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. When judges decide cases, they consider the
present and the past—they consider the case before them and how it fits with the trends
in the law and pertinent court decisions. When judges select decisions as nonpreceden-
tial they do snore—they look forward as well as backward. They predict and shape the
course of the law. This is a task distinct from those tasks that judges traditionally per-
form. I do not mean to adopt a formalistic view of the judges' responsibilities. Quite
clearly, they look forward when deciding cases in the here and now. In writing opinions,
they attempt to anticipate how the fortuities unleashed by the passage of time will push
and pull their opinions. But there is a qualitative difference between this look forward
and the gaze ahead judges must undertake to differentiate between precedential and
nonprecedential opinions.
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III. CITATION RULES AND THE ORIGINS OF FEDERAL RULE OF
APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1
The Judicial Conference, amongst other things, prescribes rules
of practice, procedure and evidence for the federal courts, subject
to the ultimate right of Congress to reject, modify, or defer any of
the rules. 55 The Judicial Conference's rule-prescribing responsibili-
ties are coordinated by its Committee on Rules of Practice and Pro-
cedure, commonly referred to as the "Standing Committee."56 The
Judicial Conference has five advisory committees to assist the Stand-
ing Committee, including one addressing appellate issues—the Ju-
dicial Conference Advisory Committee on Appellate Rules, often
referred to as the "Appellate Rules Committee."57 The Standing
Committee reviews and coordinates the recommendations of the
five advisory committees, and proposes rule changes to the Judicial
Conference "as may be necessary to maintain consistency and oth-
erwise promote the interest of justice."55 Given its role in establish-
ing federal court rules and in judicial administration, the Judicial
Conference, too, has struggled with the issue of unpublished opin-
ions from time to time and found itself a central player in the recent
debate.59
The controversy within the Judicial Conference traces back to
1990, when the Federal Courts Study Committee of the Judicial
Conference recommended that the Judicial Conference appoint an
ad hoc committee to develop uniform guidelines regarding the
courts of appeals' practice of designating certain opinions as unpub-
lished.° The Judicial Conference considered the issue in 1991 but
elected to take no action at that time. 61
55 See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2071-2074 (2000). Amendments to federal rules are adopted by
the Supreme Court after approval by the Judicial Conference. See id. §§ 2072-2074. Con-
gress may act upon any rules adopted by the Supreme Court during a period prescribed
by statute. See id. § 2074. If Congress does not enact legislation to reject or modify any
proposed rules adopted by the Court, the rules take effect. See id.; see also Anichem
Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 620 (1997) ("Federal Rules take effect after an
extensive deliberative process involving many reviewers: a Rules Advisory Committee,
public commenters, the Judicial Conference, this Court, the Congress.") (citation omit-
ted).
56 See 28 U.S.C. § 2073(b).
57 Id. § 2074 (a) (2) , (b) .
59 Id. § 2073(b).
59 See infra notes 60-98 and accompanying text.
60 FED. COURTS STUDY COMM., REPORT OF 'ME FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE
130-31 (1990), reprinted in 22 CONN. L. REV. 733, 871-72 (1990). The Federal Courts
Study Committee was created by Congress in 1988. See judicial Improvements and Access
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The topic then rested dormant on the "study agenda" of the
Appellate Rules Committee (the "Committee") for six years until
September 1997, when the Committee debated the issue and con-
cluded that it should be "retained on the study agenda with high
priority. "62 At the Committee's next meeting in April 1998 (the first
attended by then-Judge Alito as a Committee member), however, its
Chair, Judge Will Garwood of the Fifth Circuit, reported that he had
communicated with the chief judges of all of the circuits and that
they were "adamant that they did not want national rulemaking on
the topic of unpublished decisions." 65 Because it was clear to him
based on those discussions that "rules regarding unpublished deci-
sions have no chance of clearing the Judicial Conference in the
foreseeable future," Judge Garwood recommended, and the Com-
mittee unanimously agreed, to remove the issue from the Commit-
tee's study agenda without prejudice to any specific proposals that
might be made in the future. 64 Although the Committee backed
away from the issue at that meeting, U.S. Deputy Assistant Attorney
General Stephen W. Preston, attending on behalf of U.S. Solicitor
General Seth Waxman, asked the Committee whether, "notwith-
standing the strong reaction of the chief judges, it might still be
worthwhile to pursue rulemaking on the isolated question of the
citation of unpublished opinions." 65 He also indicated that the So-
licitor General would support a rule allowing the citation of unpub-
lished opinions.66
Neither the Solicitor General nor the Committee took any fur-
ther action on the issue until the Eighth Circuit panel decided
Anastasoff v. United States in August 2000. 67 Perhaps prompted by the
attention the Eighth Circuit had brought to unpublished opinions,
to Justice Act, Pub. L. No. 100-702, § 102, 102 Stat. 4642, 4644 (1988) (codified at 28
U.S.C. § 331 note (2000)).
61 See Minutes of the September 29, 1997 Meeting of the Advisory Committee on
Rules of Appellate Procedure 9 (Sept. 29, 1997) , available at lutp://www.uscourts.gov/
rules/Mintites/ap9-97.hun (noting the Judicial Conference's inaction on this issue in
1991).
62 Id. at 12.
65 See Minutes of the April 16, 1998 Meeting of the Advisory Committee on Rules of
Appellate Procedure 25-26 (Apr. 16, 1998), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/
Mi nu tes/0498appellateminutes.hull .
64 Id. at 26, 29.
65 Id. at 26.
66 Id.
67 See 223 F.3d 898, 899-905 (8th Cir.), vacated as moot on rehg, 235 F.3d 1054 (8th
Cir. 2000) (en bane); supra notes 36-41 and accompanying text.
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on January 16, 2001, in the waning days of the Clinton Administra-
tion, Solicitor General Waxman, on behalf of the U.S. Department of
Justice (the 'Justice Department"), proposed that a new rule, 32.1, be
added to the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure that would allow
citation to unpublished opinions in all federal courts of appeals. 68
The Committee took up the issue at its next meeting in April 2001, by
which point now-Chief Justice Roberts had joined the Committee as
one of its members from private practice.69 Although members re-
called the chief judges' vehement resistance to the idea when Judge
Garwood polled them in 1998, the Committee briefly discussed
whether attitudes may have changed in the intervening three years
given the turnover of chief judges and the controversy brewing over
A nastasoff " By consensus, the Committee agreed to postpone fur-
ther discussion of the proposed Rule for another meeting. 71
By the time the Committee next met in April 2002, then-Judge
Alito had become the Committee's new Chair." At the meeting, he
reported that he had surveyed the chief judges about the Justice
Department's proposal that the Federal Rules of Appellate Proce-
dure be amended to permit citation to unpublished opinions, and
that the response was mixed, with three expressing support, five op-
posing, and the others expressing varied views or not conveying a
view." The Committee debated at length whether it should propose
a national rule governing the citation of unpublished opinions, ul-
timately voting 6-3 in support of the idea and 6-3 in favor of the
Justice Department's proposed Rule 32.1, with minor revisions.74
The Committee next met in November 2002. 76 At that session,
the members discussed three alternative versions of proposed Rule
" Letter from Seth P. Waxman to Judge Will Garwood, supra note 4, at 1.
69 See Minutes of the April 11, 2001. Meeting of the Advisory Committee on Rules of
Appellate Procedure 64-65 (Apr. 11, 2001), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/
Minutes/app0401.pdf.
75 Id.
71 Id. at 65.
72 See Minutes of the April 22, 2002 Meeting of the Advisory Committee on Rules of
Appellate Procedure 1 (Apr. 22, 2002), available al http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/
Minutes/app0402.pdf.
75 See id. at 23. The Minutes of the meeting specify each chief judge's response. See
id.
74 See id. at 24-27. One of the revisions was to change any references to "unpub-
lished" decisions to "non-precedential," as one committee member noted that the word
"unpublished" had become a "misnomer" and observed that many "unpublished" opin-
ions were being published in the Federal Appendix. Id. at 26-27.
75 See Minutes of the November 18, 2002 Meeting of the Advisory Committee on Rules
of Appellate Procedure 1 (Nov. 18, 2002) thereinafter Minutes of the November 2002 Meet-
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32.1, all of which had been drafted by the Committee's Reporter,
Professor Patrick &blitz (now a federal district court judge in Min-
nesota)." "Alternative A"—the broadest version of the proposed
Rule—both authorized courts to issue nonprecedential opinions
and allowed unqualified citation to those opinions." "Alternative B"
was silent about whether courts can or should issue nonprecedential
opinions, but permitted unlimited citation to any such opinions."
"Alternative C" was the narrowest version, merely authorizing cita-
tion to nonprecedential opinions in limited circumstances."
The Committee quickly rejected Alternative A by consensus,
with members expressing concern about adopting a procedural rule
that appeared to take a side in the debate over the constitutionality
of nonprecedential opinions. 8° Members of the Committee were
unanimous in wanting to limit any new rule to the issue of citation. 8 '
After extended discussion, 82 the Committee approved Alternative B
ing of the Appellate Rules Advisory Committee], available at http://www.uscourts.gov/
rules/Minutes/app1102.pdf. In the midst of this process, in June 2002 the Subcommittee
on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Property of the U.S. House of Representatives
Committee on the Judiciary conducted hearings on the topic of "unpublished judicial opin-
ions." See Unpublished judicial Opinions: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet, and
Intellectual Property of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. 1 (2002) thereinafter Hear-
ing]. The Subcommittee heard testimony from several witnesses: Judge (now Justice) Alito,
then a member of the Third Circuit and Chair of the Advisory Committee on Appellate
Rules, id. at 5-9, 55-65; Judge Alex Kozinski of the Ninth Circuit, id. at 9-20, 55-65; Ken-
neth Schmier, Chairman of a group called Committee for the Rule of Law, and brother of
Michael Schmier, who challenged the Ninth Circuit's rules against citation to unpublished
opinions on constitutional grounds, see id. at 20-41, 55-65; supra note 50; and Professor
Arthur Hellman of the University of Pittsburgh School of Law, Hearing, supra, at 42-55, 55-
65. In 1996, the Subcommittee on Administrative Oversight and the Courts of the U.S.
Senate Committee on the Judiciary wrote a letter to federal appeals court and district court
judges soliciting their views about unpublished opinions. See generally Tatel, supra note 5
(noting the Subcommittee's letter and stating his views in response).
76 Minutes of the November 2002 Meeting of the Appellate Rules Advisory Commit-
tee, supra note 75, at 22-35.
77 See id. at 23.
78 See id. at 28.
79 See id. at 31-32.
88 See id. at 35.
81 See Minutes of the November 2002 Meeting of the Appellate Rules Advisory
Committee, supra note 75, at 35.
82 During the discussion, Douglas Letter, representing U.S. Solicitor General Ted Ol-
son, said that although the Justice Department had originally asked the Committee to
approve a citation rule and continued to favor one, based on discussions with Judge Alex
Kozinski of the Ninth Circuit and other opponents of the Rule, the Solicitor General
had become troubled by some of the concerns that they raised. Id. at 35. Later in the
discussion, Letter stated that if the Committee decided to proceed with a proposed Rule,
the Justice Department would favor Alternative 1.1 over Alternative C. Id.
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with a number of relatively minor changes by a vote of 7-1, with one
abstention, and asked the Reporter to revise the draft Rule for the
next meeting."
At that meeting in May 2003, the Committee (on which now-
Chief Justice Roberts remained a member after his May 8, 2003
confirmation by the Senate as a judge on the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the D.C. Circuit) reviewed the draft Rule 32.1 and approved a
slightly modified version by a 7-1 vote, with one abstention. 84 The
approved version of the Rule provided:
Rule 32.1. Citation of Judicial Dispositions
(a) Citation Permitted. No prohibition or restriction may be
imposed upon the citation; of judicial opinions, orders,
judgments, or other written dispositions that have been des-
ignated as "unpublished," "not for publication," "non-
precedential," "not precedent," or the like, unless that pro-
hibition or restriction is generally imposed upon the citation
of all sources.85
After Judge Alito, as Chair, reported the proposed Rule to the
Standing Committee," the Judicial Conference solicited public
comment on the proposed Rule. 87 It received more than 500 sub-
missions in late 2003 and early 2004 (the second highest number of
submissions in the history of federal rulemaking and an unprece-
dented number for a proposed, appellate rule), including dozens
85 See id. at 35-39. One revision the COmmittee made was to change the title of the
proposal from "Citation of Non-Precedential Opinions" to "Citation of Opinions Desig-
nated As Non-Precedential"—wanting to stay as clear as possible from implying a view
about the jurisprudential impact of "nonpr'ccedential" opinions. Id. at 39.
84 Minutes of the May 15, 2003 Meeting !of the Advisory Committee on Rules of Appel-
late Procedure 11-17 (May 15, 2003), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Minutes/
app0503.pdf.
85 Id. at II , 17. Subsection (b) of the proposed Rule required that copies of written
dispositions "not available in a publicly accessible electronic database" be filed with any
brief or other paper in which it is cited. Id. at 11.
88 See Memorandum from Judge Samuel A. Alito, Jr., Chair, Advisory Committee on
Appellate Rules, to Judge Anthony J. Scirica, Chair, Standing Committee on Rules of
Practice and Procedure 27-36 (May 22, 2003), available at http://www,uscourts.gov/
rules/app0803.pdf. By the time Judge Alito reported Rule 32.1 to the Standing Com-
mittee, the end of subsection (a) had beeri amended slightly to read "unless that prohi-
bition is generally imposed upon the citation of all judicial opinions, orders, judgments,
or other written dispositions." Id. at 29.
87
 Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32.1, 68 Fed. Reg. 53392 (proposed Sept. 10,
2003).
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from federal appeals court judges, individually or in groups. 88 The
Judicial Conference also conducted public hearings on April 13,
2004, during which fifteen witnesses testified. 89 The following day,
the Appellate Rules Committee voted in favor of proposed Rule
32.1.9°
The Standing Committee considered proposed Rule 32.1 at its
June 2004 meeting.91 After Judge Alito reported on the proposed
rule—noting that it would "merely prevent a court of appeals from
prohibiting the citation of unpublished opinions" but would not
"require a court to give unpublished opinions any weight or prece-
dential value"92—the Standing Committee voted to take no action
on the proposed Rule and returned it to the Appellate Rules Com-
mittee, with the expectation that the Appellate Rules Committee
would work with the FJC to conduct empirical research on unpub-
lished opinions 98 At its November 2004 meeting, the Appellate
Rules Committee noted the June 2004 decision by the Standing
Committee, and announced that the FJC had designed a study and
was considering proposed Rule 32.1 with the assistance of the Ad-
ministrative Office of the U.S. Courts. 94
98 See Schiltz, supra note 6, at 23-24, 29 ("Proposed Rule 32.1 is, without question,
one of the most controversial proposals in the history of federal rulemaking.")
89 See generally Transcript of Bearing Before Advisory Committee on Appellate Rules
(Apr. 13, 2004), available at littp://www.uscourts.gov/rules/0413APPE.DOC.pdf.
90 See Minutes of the April 13-14, 2004 Meeting of the Advisory Committee on Rules of
Appellate Procedure 2-12 (Apr. 13-14, 2004), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/
Minutes/app0404.pdf. At the meeting Judge Roberts reported to the Appellate Rules
Committee that during his appearance at the Standing Committee's January 2004 meeting
(which he attended as a replacement for Judge Alito), he had "stressed that the rule and
accompanying Committee Note were drafted to take no position on the issue of whether it
is lawful for a court to refuse to give binding precedential effect to one of its opinions." Id.
at 2. It is also reported that. Roberts spoke in favor of the Rule at the April 2004 Appellate
Rules Committee meeting, but the official minutes do not reflect such a statement, nor do
they identify the two Committee members who did not favor the proposed Rule. See id. at
2-12; see also Tony Mauro, Court Opinions No Longer Cites Unseen, LEGAL TIMES, Sept. 26,
2005, at 8 (quoting Roberts as stating that "[a) lawyer ought to be able to tell a court what
it has done").
91 Minutes of the June 17-18, 2004 Meeting of the Committee on Rules of Practice and
Procedure 8-11 ( June 17-18, 2004), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Min
utes/june2004.pdf.
92 Id. at 8.
ss Id. at 11. The Standing Committee approved that action by a voice vote, without
objection. S e i . •
94 See Minutes of the November 9, 2004 Meeting of the Advisory Committee on Rules
of Appellate Procedure 1-2 (Nov. 9, 2004), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/
Minutes/app1104.pdf.
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By the Appellate Rules Committee's next meeting in April 2005,
the FJC had prepared a preliminary report analyzing citations to
unpublished opinions. 95 Apparently convinced that most of the con-
cerns about permitting citation to unpublished opinions were not
borne out by the FJC's investigation, the Committee voted 7-2 to
approve proposed Appellate Rule 32.1, again sending it to the
Standing Committee for consideration. 96
At its June 2005 meeting, the Standing Committee unanimously
approved proposed Rule 32.1 and forwarded it to the Judicial Con-
ference, with any concerns about the Rule seemingly dispelled by
the studies of the FJC and Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts. 97
Three months later, the Judicial Conference approved the proposed
Rule, after amending it to apply only to decisions issued on or after
January 1, 2007, and forwarded it to the U.S. Supreme Court in No-
vember 2005.98 The Supreme Court approved the new Rule on April
12, 2006.99
 The Rule is scheduled to take effect in December
2006. 100
95 See generally FED. JUDICIAL CTR., CITATIONS TO UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS IN THE Fan.
ERAL Comers OF APPEALS: PRELIMINARY REPORT (2005), available at http://www.fjc.gov/
public/pdfusf/lookup/citatiol.pcif/Vile/citatiol.pdf. The report was later finalized. See
generally FED. JUDICIAL. OFR., CITATIONS TO UNPURLISHED OPINIONS IN THE FEDERAL COURTS
OF APPEALS (2005) [hereinafter FJC, UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS', available at http://www.ljc.
gov/public/pdfaisf/lookup/citado34xif/$file/citado3.pdf (documenting the results of a
survey of federal appeals court judges and appellate attorneys, and of an examination of cases
filed and resolved in federal appeals courts).
96 See Minutes of the April 18, 2005 Meeting of the Advisory Committee on Rules of
Appellate Procedure 2-18 (Apr. 18, 2005), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/
Minutes/APO4-2005-min.pdf; see also Schiltz, supra note 6, at 64 (observing, as Appellate
Rules Committee Reporter, that all of the Committee members "agreed that the studies
were well done and that they failed to support the main contentions of Rule 32.1's op-
ponents").
91 See Minutes of the June 15-16 Meeting of the Committee on Rules of Practice and
Procedure 10-11 ( June 15-16, 2004), available at http://www.uscotirts.gov/rules/Mintstes/
ST June_2005.pdf; Schiltz, supra note 6, at 65.
98 See ,JUIACIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDI-
CIAL CONFERENCE or -rim UNITED STATES 36-37 (2005), available at http://wwwus
courts.gov/judconf/sept05proc_final.pdf . The text of the Rule as revised by the Judicial
Conference provides: "A court may not prohibit or restrict the citation of federal judicial
opinions, orders, judgments, or other written dispositions that have been: (i) designated as
'unpublished,' 'riot for publication,"tion-precedential,"not precedent,' or the like; and
(ii) issued on or after January 1, 2007." Memorandum from Judge Samuel A. Alito, Jr.,
Chair, Advisory Committee on Appellate Rules, to Judge David F. Levi, Chair, Standing
Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure 2 (May 6, 2005, revised Oct. 7, 2005),
available at Ilttp://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Reports/AP10-2005.pd1:
9g Order, supra note 1.
100
 See supra note 55 (discussing process for federal rulentaking). The Court must
transmit proposed amendments to Congress by May 1 of the year in which the amend-
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IV. THE FOUNDATION OF THE PRACTICE OF DESIGNATING
OPINIONS AS NONPRECEDENTIAL
A. The Underpinnings of Unpublished Opinions
Although the specific criteria courts of appeals use in deciding
which of their opinions to designate nonprecedential vary consid-
erably, the courts' essential mission is the same: they attempt to sort
out cases that do not "break new legal ground" or "alter, modify or
clarify existing law.noi The premise that judges can and should
make this determination at the moment a ruling is made, and with-
out the benefit of input from others, is seriously flawed. 1°2 And even
though this premise rests at the foundation of the system of unpub-
lished opinions, it has received remarkably little attention in the re-
cent debates over the issue. 103
A report drafted for the American College of Trial Lawyers
aptly describes the practice of designating certain opinions as non-
precedential: "We put the important decisions in the 'A' pile and
the unimportant ones in the 'B' pile .... Everything you will ever
need is over here in the 'A' pile.... [T]he 'B' pile case[s] do[] not
say anything new."'" The report's author (a critic of rules limiting
citation to unpublished opinions) refers to the idea that cases be-
longing in the "B" pile can be readily and accurately identified as
the "redundancy" principle.m This principle, and the entire system
of bifurcating appellate dispositions into precedential and non-
ment is to take effect. See 28 U.S.C. § 2074 (2000). If Congress does not reject or modify
it, the Rule will become effective on December 1,2006. See id.
101 See supra notes 24-26 (setting out criteria courts use to designate decisions as
nonprecedential).
102 For a discussion of the process of deciding whether a decision should be deemed
"unpublished," see Stephen L. Washy, Unpublished Court of Appeals Decisions: A Hard Look
at the Process, 14 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 67,111-23 (2004).
105 Although a thorough discussion of precedent and its relationship to stare decisis
is beyond the scope of this article, numerous other articles include instructive discus-
sions of the nature of precedent. See, e.g., Boggs & Brooks, supra note 5, at 23-25; K.K.
DuVivier, Are Some Words Better Left Unpublished?: Precedent and the Role of Unpublished Deci-
sions, 3 J. API". PRAc. & PROCESS 397,414-18 (2001); Rohe], supra note 5, at 404-09. See
generally Larry Alexander, Constrained by Precedent, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1 (1989); Charles W.
Collier, Precedent and Legal Authority: A Critical History, 1988 Wis. L. REv. 771; John
Harrison, The Power of Congress over the Rules of Precedent, 50 DUKE L.J. 503 (2000); Thomas
Healy, Stare Decisis as a Constitutional Requirement, 104 W. VA. L. REV. 43 (2001).
I's William T. Hangley, Opinions Hidden, Citations Forbidden: A Report and Recommenda-
tions of the American College of Trial Lawyers on the Publication and Citation of Nonbinding
Federal Circuit Court Opinions, 208 F.R.D. 645,673,680 (2002).
105 Id. at 680.
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precedential categories at the time they are made, is based on a le-
gal fiction.
First, this fiction has a temporal component. By assigning
precedential value to opinions at the time they arc issued, the ren-
dering judges are making a prediction about their future value.'"
Like all other prognosticators, judges make mistakes. 1 °7 But the
problem with putting judges in the position of predicting the future
value and relevance of their opinions goes beyond that posed by the
fallibility of judges. It is simply an impossible task to predict future
value and relevance, because the information necessary for accurate
forecasting does not yet exist. An opinion's significance depends in
part on future events; there are limits on judges' ability to foresee
those events and all of the ways opinions may be fairly marshaled by
litigants.'" Although judges are as well-equipped as, or better-
equipped than, anyone else to venture a guess, this undertaking is
destined to fail if the objective is anything close to complete accu-
racy. An opinion's true precedential value can only be assessed by
looking backwards after time has passed and its meaning has been
debated and tested.'"
106 See DuVivier, supra note 103, at 416-17 ("By designating some cases as published
and others as unpublished, the judges themselves are attempting to predict which cases
will have future significance."); Howard Slavitt, Selling the Integrity of the System of Precedent:
Selective Publication, Depublication, and Vacatur, 30 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 109, 125 (1995)
("The critical assumption underlying the efficiency rationale in fiwor of nonpublication
is that judges are able to determine in advance which opinions will be valuable to future
litigants.").
107 Several commentators have remarked on judges' fallibility in deciding whether
their decisions are, or should be, precedential. See, e.g., Brian P. Brooks, Publishing Un-
published Opinions: A Review of the Federal Appendix, 5 GREEN BAG 2n 259, 260 (2002) ("A
careful read of the Federal Appendix reveals just how imperfect is an appellate panel's
ability to predict in advance which decisions are pathbreaking, interesting, or important
enough to merit the for publication' designation."); Greenwald & Schwarz, supra note
9, at 1153 ("There is evidence that judges are not unerring judges of the value of their
own work product,"); Hangley, supra note 104, at 674 ("The judges and their screening
clerks are not and never will be infallible in determining what is or is not a novel holding
or a helpfid discussion, or what will be one when considered in the context of a legal
dispute that hasn't happened yet, and the functions for which past decisions may or
must be cited are infinitely variable and largely unpredictable.").
I" See Philip Nichols, Jr., Selective Publication of Opinions: One fudges View, 35 Am. U. L.
REV. 909, 921 (1986) ("Very often we find our opinions doing duty as precedents in ways
quite other than we expected .... Our surprise may be ... because we have failed to
anticipate the problems our opinions will he used to solve.").
109 See Cappalli, supra note 5, at 773 ("The duty of determining the precedential im-
pact of the decision-with-opinion belonged not to the precedent-setting court bat to the
precedent-applying court."); Hangley, supra note 104, at 686 ("[Al particular opinion,
holding or statement may have more persuasive merit or significance on one day than
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Second, there is the fiction that the particular judges rendering
a decision are the only meaningful participants in the process of de-
ciding whether it will have future significance. The significance (and
even the meaning) of judicial opinions cannot be ascertained by
rendering judges alone, particularly not at the moment the decision
is issued. Vesting decisions with meaning and significance is, by its
nature, a process in which other judges and lawyers (and sometimes
others, like the media) participate. 11° The full meaning of a judicial
opinion is, in this sense, social—it is dependent on a type of dia-
logue among the participants in the broader legal community. 111
Given that the system of unpublished opinions is built upon this
fiction, it should be no surprise that the process of sorting decisions
into the "A" and "B" piles reveals serious flaws. 112 There is consider-
able evidence that judges are deciding important and contested is-
sues in unpublished opinions, and that they are applying the non-
precedential designation more broadly than they should.u 3
on another day ...."); Martineau, supra note 9, at 135 ("Limited publication and cita-
tion rules require judges to determine in advance the rule of law that will emerge from a
case, and then to determine the effect of their decisions on the development of the law.
Because our common law system emphasizes the importance of facts in each case, judges
hardly can hope to predict the facts of future disputes. They cannot know today what will
be crucial to litigants of tomorrow, even when they follow the standards designed to aid
them in this determination."); Steve Sheppard, The Unpublished Opinion Opinion: How
Richard Arnold's Anastasoff Opinion Is Saving America's Courts from Themselves, 2002 ARK. L.
Noms 85, 95 ("The precedential value of an opinion has historically been assessed by
the later court, not by the court that decides the case.").
111/ See Boggs & Brooks, supra note 5, at 25 ("One such truth is that judge-made law is
a 'grown order' rather than a 'made order.' 'Made orders'—such as statutory schemes----
'originate[] from the design of [their] creator,' while 'grown orders'—such as judge-
made law—'arise without a plan ... (with] orderly features [that] result from equilib-
rium rather than from someone's design.'" (quoting Mark F. Grady, Positive Theories and
Grown Order Conceptions of the Law, 23 Sw. U. L. REV. 461, 461 (1994))); Robel, supra note
5, at 410 (*The courts look ... to the future value of opinions. However, ... the future
value of what they write is not, culturally speaking, determined by the authoring judge
alone; rather, it is determined by consumers."); see abojones v. Superintendent, Va. State
Farm, 465 F.2d 1091, 1093 (4th Cir. 1972) ("No appellate court can ever be much better
than its bar.").
tut See James Boyd White, 117tat's an Opinion For?, 62 U. Cum L. REV. 1363, 1367-68
(1995) (discussing role of opinions in the "conversation that is ... law").
112 See supra note 104 and accompanying text. Some commentators have referred to
the process of deciding whether or not a decision will be designated precedential as a
"sorting device." See, e.g., Boggs & Brooks, supra note 5, at 19.
113 As two commentators have rightly observed, "the consequence of not publishing
a useful precedent is much greater than the consequence of publishing a redundant,
useless one." Greenwald & Schwarz, supra note 9, at 1153.
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For instance, one might expect virtually all unpublished opin-
ions to be unanimous dispositions affirming lower court rulings be-
cause the selection criteria suggest that opinions designated as un-
published should involve routine application of existing law, about
which panel members presumably would agree." 4 Yet a significant
number of such opinions include dissents," 5 and/or reverse district
court rulings. 116 One might also expect unpublished opinions rarely,
if ever, to be the subject of Supreme Court review. Yet the Court has
elected to review dozens of unpublished appeals court opinions, 17
in many cases reversing the court's dccision." 8 Still other cases in-
volve circuit splits, where at least one of the court of appeals deci-
sions addressing the disputed issue was unpublished." 9
114 See supra notes 24-26 and accompanying text.
115 See Hannon, supra note 18, at 221-24; see also Deborah Jones Merritt & Jantes J.
13rudney, Stalking Secret Law: What Predicts Publication in the United States Courts of Appeals,
54 VAND. L. REV. 71, 120 (2001) ("Unpublished decisions do not reflect routine applica-
tions of existing law with which all judges would agree. If they did, these decisions would
not include a noticeable number of reversals, dissents, or concurrences, nor would they
show significant associations between case outcome and judicial characteristics.... We
know that at least some unpublished decisions reach results with which other judges
would disagree ....").
116 See Hannon, supra note 18, at 215-21.
117 See id. at 227-31, 241-50 (discussing the Supreme Court's review of unpublished
federal appeals court opinions and listing cases in which the Court has, among other
things, reviewed unpublished dispositions).
115 See, e.g., Nat'l Archives & Records Admin. v. Favish, 541 U.S. 157, 175 (2004), rev 'g
37 F. App'x 863 (9th Cir. 2(102) (unpublished); Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox
Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 38 (2003), rev'g 34 F. App'x 312 (9th Cir. 2002) (unpublished);
Holmes Croup, Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Sys., Inc., 535 U.S. 826, 834 (2002), rev'g
13 F. App'x 961 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (unpublished); Sims v. Apfel, 530 U.S. 103, 112 (2000),
rev'g No. 98-60126, 1998 WL 792809 (5th Cie Nov. 6, 1998) (unpublished) (published
subsequent to grant of certiorari at 200 F,3d 229); Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of
Am., 511 U.S. 375, 382 (1994), revk No. 92-16628, 1993 WL 164884 (9th Cir. May 18,
1993) (unpublished); Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 276 (1988), rev 'g . 86-5198, 1987
WL 36042 (Gth Cir. May 22, 1987) (unpublished); Baldwin Comity Welcome Cie v.
Brown, 466 U.S. 147, 152 (1984), rev'g No. 82-7033, 698 F.2d 1236 (11th Cir. Jan. 31,
1983) (unpublished); Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 154 (1983), revg No. 81-3203, 654
F.2d 719 (5th Cir. Jul 23, 1981) (unpublished); Moore v. Illinois, 434 U.S. 220, 232
(1977), rev'g No. 75-1697, 534 F.2d 331 (7th Cir. Apr. 27, 1976) (unpublished); see also
Boggs & Brooks, supra note 5, at 20-21 (noting that the Supreme Court has reversed a
number of unpublished dispositions); Hannon, supra note 18, at 241-50 (listing cases,
including more than forty in which the Supreme Court reversed or vacated an unpub-
lished disposition).
119 See, e.g., E, Associated Coal Corp. v. United Mine Workers of Am., Dist. 17, 531
U.S. 57, 61 (2000) (noting that the circuit court's opinion was unpublished and that the
circuits were split over the underlying issue), aff'g Nu. 98-2527, 1999 WL 635632 (4th Cir.
Aug. 20, 1999) (unpublished); Carter v. United States, 530 U.S. 255, 260 (2000) (same),
aff'g No. 98-5491, 185 F.3d 863 (3d Cir. June 16, 1999) (unpublished); Thompson v.
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Many judges have acknowledged it is difficult to determine accu-
rately at the time of disposition which cases should be assigned
precedential value; 120 others have gone further and acknowledged
that the system does not work as it should. 12 ' In a speech delivered
nearly three decades ago, Justice John Paul Stevens observed that the
practice itself "rests on a false premise" in that it "assumes that an
author is a reliable judge of the quality and importance of his own
work product. "122
The FJC's recent study, undertaken at the behest of the Stand-
ing Committee, 123 also calls the underpinnings of the practice of
designating certain decisions as nonprecedential into question. Ac-
cording to a survey of all federal appeals court judges, almost 85%
reported that it has at least sometimes been difficult to reconcile an
Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 106 (1995) (same), vacating No. 94-35052, 1994 WL 424289 (9th
Cir. Aug. 11, 1994) (unpublished).
120 See, e.g., Boggs Sc Brooks, supra note 5, at 21 (noting that "individual panels of
judges are only imperfectly able to predict future events and disputes that will influence
the development of the law"); Edward A. Adams, Increased Use of Unpublished Rulings
Faulted, N.Y. LT, Aug. 2, 1994, at 1 (noting the Tenth Circuit's decision to allow citation
to unpublished opinions and quoting then-Chief Judge of the Tenth Circuit, Stephanie
K. Seymour, as stating that "limiting unpublished decisions to those with no precedential
value 'is the theory, but it's not always the practice. Some turn out to have precedential
value even when the panel of judges thought they didn't'"); see also Jones, 465 F.2d at
1094 ("We concede, of course, that any decision is by definition a precedent ....");
Patricia M. Wald, The Rhetoric of Results and the Results of Rhetoric: Judicial Writings, 62 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1371, 1376 (1995) ("In my own D.C. Circuit, the wide gap between the
number of published and unpublished opinions written by different judges gives
pause.").
121 See, e.g., Arnold, supra note 5, at 224 ("[M]any cases with obvious legal impor-
tance are being decided by unpublished opinions."); Wald, supra note 120, at 1374 ("In a
study of the D.C. Circuit's unpublished decisions several years ago, a bar committee,
applying our own written criteria, questioned the decision not to publish in 40 percent
of the cases. I would guess the number would be much higher now."); see also Bruce M.
Selya, Publish and Perish: The Fate of the Federal Appeals Judge in the Information Age, 55 Chit°
Sr. L.J. 405, 414 (1994) ("Unfortunately, ... even in circuits with strict rules on the
books, the practical criterion for publication is the amount of time that the judge puts
into an opinion.").
1" See Justice John Paul Stevens, Address to the Illinois State Bar Association's Cen-
tennial Dinner: Some Thoughts and Reflections on the Litigation Explosion and How It
Has Affected the Courts' Ability to Cope with the Problem (Jan. 22, 1977), in 65 ILL. BJ.
508, 510 (1977). Justice Stevens has also directly or indirectly criticized unpublished
opinions in decisions written while on the Supreme Court. See, e.g., Taylor v. United
States, 493 U.S. 906, 907 (1989) (Stevens, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari);
County of L.A. v. Kling, 474 U.S. 936, 938 (1985) (Stevens, J., dissenting from summary
reversal) ("[The Ninth Circuit's] decision not to publish the opinion or permit it to be
cited—like the decision to promulgate a rule spawning a body of secret law—was plainly
wrong.").
123 See supra notes 93-95 and accompanying text.
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unpublished opinion of their court with one of their published
opinions. 124 Presumably, most appeals court judges would not be
surprised to learn that appeals courts have relied on their own un-
published opinions from time to time 125—a practice that makes no
sense if the unpublished decision was not precedent and added
nothing new to existing case law. 12G
The premise that judges can and should determine whether
they have made "new law" at the moment a ruling is made, and
without the benefit of input from others, also appears to reflect cer-
tain strands of legal formalism that were displaced decades ago. Al-
though the legacy of "legal realism" is subject to debate, it is clear
that some of its lessons are firmly entrenched in mainstream con-
124 SeeFiC, UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS, supra note 95, at 11, 40.
125 See Hangley, supra note 104, at 655 (discussing a Fifth Circuit decision in which
the court relied on a prior, unpublished decision of that court and included the prior
decision as an attachment to the published ruling); Hannon, supra note 18, at 231-35 &
tb1.6 (discussing results of author's own study of citation to unpublished opinions by
Federal appeals courts); see also Robel, supra note 5, at 406-07 (discussing Hannon's
study).
126 Some courts entertain requests to convert nonprecedential opinions to prece-
dential ones. See Isl. CIR. R. 36(b) (2) (D) ("Ally party or other interested person may
apply for good cause shown to the court for publication of an unpublished opinion.");
4 -rn Cm. R. 36(b) ("Counsel may move for publication of an unpublished opinion, cit-
ing reasons. If such motion is granted, the unpublished opinion will be published with-
out change in result."); 7•rii Cm, R. 53(d) (3) ("Any person may request by motion that a
decision by unpublished order be issued as a published opinion. The request should
state the reasons why the publication would be consistent with the guidelines for method
of disposition set forth in [Seventh Circuit Rule 53(c) (1)]."); 8TH CIR. INTERNAL OPER-
ATINC. P. IV.B ("Counsel may request, by motion, that an unpublished opinion be pub-
lished."); 9-rn Cm. R. 36-4 ("Publication of any unpublished disposition may be re-
quested by letter addressed to the Clerk, stating concisely the reasons for publication.");
I ITri Cut. R. 36-3 ("At any time before the mandate has issued, the panel, on its own
motion or upon the motion of a party, may by unanimous vote order a previously unpub-
lished opinion to be published."); 11TH Ctit. R. 36-3, I.O.P. 6 ("Parties may request pub-
lication of an unpublished opinion by filing a motion to that effect ...."); D.C. CIR. R.
36(d) ("Any person may, by motion made within 30 days after judgment, or, if a timely
petition for rehearing is made, within 30 clays after action thereon, request that an un-
published opinion be published."); FED. CIR. R. 47.6(c) ("Within 60 days after any non-
precedential opinion or order is issued, any person 'may request, with accompanying
reasons, that the opinion or order be reissued as precedential."). That courts appear to
grant such motions often also raises questions about the rigor with which they make
publication decisions. See, e.g., Guan v. Bd. of Immigration Appeals, 345 F.3d 47, 48 n.1
(2d Cir. 2003) (noting decision to grant motion to publish "[biecause we are persuaded
that this decision may have sonic precedential value ...."); In re Administrative Sub-
poena, 289 F.3d 843, 843 n.* (6th Cir. 2001) (noting decision to grant motion to pub-
lish); Doty v. Ill. Cent_ R.R. Co., 162 F.3d 460, 460 n.* (7th Cir. 1998) (same).
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temporary legal thought.' 27 For example, the realist insights that law
is not "discovered" and that judges are required to exercise judg-
ment are widely accepted.' 28 Today it would be difficult to find
someone who disagrees with Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes's obser-
vation that "the life of the law" has been experience rather than
logic.' 29 It is also widely accepted that discerning the meaning and
holding of cases is often difficult, and that precedents frequently are
subject to multiple reasonable interpretations.'" If nothing else, le-
gal realism contributed significantly to freeing us from the illusion
that deciding cases or understanding judicial decisions is easy.
Assessing whether a decision makes "new law" is an enormously
challenging undertaking, even assuming (as some steadfast realists
would not) that the endeavor makes sense at all. A system that asks
judges to resolve this question at the moment they issue a decision,
and without the benefit of input from others, rests upon antiquated
ideas about how the law develops. It is hard enough for judges to get
cases "right" without having to take on the additional task of assess-
ing the relationship of their just-completed opinion to the entire
body of case law previously decided by their court.
B. Rethinking Unpublished Opinions
Any discussion of the problems associated with the existing sys-
tem of unpublished opinions must include an assessment of the prac-
427 See MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1870-1960:
THE CRISIS OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY 193-212 (1992) (describing legal realism's legacy as
its challenge to orthodox legal thought); Joseph William Singer, Legal Realism Now, 76
CAL. L. REV. 465,532742 (1988) (book review) (discussing disagreements underlying the
legal realism debate).
1 " See Dan Simon, A Psychological Model of Judicial Decision Making, 30 RUTGERS U. 1,
7 (1998) (discussing the "pre-realist characterization of the judicial function as one of
merely finding and pronouncing extant law").
129 OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., TIIE COMMON LAW 1 (44th pig. 1951).
130 See HoRwrrz, supra note 127, at 199 ("Late-nineteenth-century legal thought has
often been called formalistic because of its aspiration to be able to render one right
answer to any legal question. In attacking deductive legal reasoning, Legal Realists made
more original and lasting contributions to legal thought than in any other area.");
Singer, supra note 127, at 470 Mlle legal realists [argued] that lawyers could not use
legal rules alone to predict judicial decisions. They gave at least three separate reasons
for this claim. First, they argued that legal rules were often vague and therefore ambigu-
ous.... Second, the realists argued that judges could not determine, in a nondiscretion-
ary way, the holdings or decided cases... • Third, the realists argued that, because of the
indeterminacy of abstract. concepts and the manipulability of precedent, it was almost
always possible to appeal to competing and contradictory rules to decide any interesting
contested case.").
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tical realities about how the judiciary operates. It is impossible to deny
the enormous challenges courts of appeals face in keeping up with
heavy caseloads, and the considerable time and energy required to
generate thoughtful, comprehensive, and clear opinions. 131 Moreover,
it is undeniable that dispositions short of full-blown opinions are use-
ful to judges in meeting those challenges. It would be a mistake, how-
ever, to conclude that the only way to achieve the advantages afforded
by our current system of unpublished opinions is to retain it as is. Do-
ing away with the ex ante designation of opinions as precedential and
nonprecedential would not require judges to write full-blown opin-
ions in all (or even most) cases or require the highest level of atten-
tion and scrutiny by the court. Truly easy cases could be resolved with
limited explanations of the court's ruling and the reasons for it.'"
Many courts already resolve some of their cases through such vehi-
cles. 133
Dispensing with the practice of classifying some opinions as
nonprecedential at the time they arc rendered surely would greatly
expand the universe of decisions that litigants could bring to a
court's attention as authority. But the nature and quality of those
decisions will be unchanged—only the labels applied to them will
151
 If courts of appeals continue to designate some of their decisions as nonprece-
dential at the time of decision, that process must be undertaken with rigor, not as an
afterthought. Discerning whether and how a particular decision is precedential is often
no easy task, and can be time-consuming. See generally Michael Abramowicz & Maxwell
Stearns, Defining Dicta, 57 STAN. L. REV. 953 (2005) (developing a model for distinguish-
ing between holdings and dicta); Michael C. Dorf, Dicta and Article 111, 142 U. PA. L. REV.
1997 (1994) (discussing the holding/dictum distinction through the lens of Article III).
Many supporters of unpublished opinions seem to ignore the time that should spent
carefully assessing whether a decision should be designated as nonprecedential, and how
this might offset some of the efficiencies derived from writing nonprecedential opinions.
See Cappalli, supra note 5, at 768 (`vfhe very choice of treating an appealed case as non-
precedential, if done conscientiously, has to be preceded by thoughtful analysis of the
relevant precedents."),
IS! Some might contend that this reform merely would lead to the relabeling of
heretofore "unpublished opinions"--something like "summary order" or "memoran-
dum." There can be little doubt that many such opinions would be decided with only a
cursory written disposition. But the point is that the necessary efficiencies gained by
disposing of some cases with an exhaustive opinion can be retained without casting the
vast majority of decisions aside as nonprecedential.
135 See 1ST CIR. R. 36(a) (order or memorandum and order); 2u OR. R. § 0.23
(summary order); 4TH CIR. INTERNAL OPERATING P. 36.3 (summary opinion); 9TH CIR.
R. 36-1 (memorandum or order); 10TH CIR. It 36.1 (disposition without. opinion); I ITH
Cm. R. 36-1 (affirmance without opinion); D.C. CIR. R. 36(b) (abbreviated disposition);
D.C. CIR. INTERNAL 014;RATtNy. P. XILA (judgment or order without memorandum);
Fen. CIR.. R. 36 (affirmance without opinion).
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differ. As they do now, courts would wade through lawyers' argu-
ments about the relevance and persuasiveness of prior decisional
law, and resolve cases in the ways they think appropriate.'"
CONCLUSION
At first blush, it might seem surprising that a rule of appellate
procedure became the subject of heated debate within the legal
community. But the rules governing publication of and citation to
judicial opinions arc not only central to the judiciary's self-
identity—they are also critical to lawyers and the public, shaping
how litigants' cases are treated by the courts and how litigants com-
municate with courts through their counsel.
In many respects, however, the years of effort and attention sur-
rounding. Rule 32.1 have been a diversion from the more fundamen-
tal issues regarding unpublished opinions. From the moment it was
conceived, the Rule was written to be "deliberately narrow"—in-
tended to acknowledge "that the courts of appeals designate some of
their decisions as unpublished or non-precedential," but to take "no
position on the ongoing debate concerning the propriety of that
practice" and not "purport[ing] to dictate to courts or judges what
weight should be given to unpublished decisions." 135
The deliberative process leading up to the enactment of Rule
32.1 consciously and conspicuously ignored the pink elephant in the
middle of the room. 136 Now that the issue of citation to unpublished
opinions is resolved and behind us, it is time to rethink the system of
unpublished opinions itself. Any complete reassessment of that sys-
154 See Panel Discussion, The Appellate Judges Speak, 74 FORIMIAM L. REV. 1, 17 (2005)
(First Circuit Chief Judge Michael Boudin stating, "Precedential weight, of course, is not
an 'on' or 'off switch," and "opinions get very different weight depending on all kinds
of circumstances: who wrote them, how recently, how persuasive they are"); Berman &
Cooper, supra note 5, at 2039-40 ("If a case genuinely calls only for a straightforward
application of well-settled law, then it is likely to receive summary treatment whether or
not the opinion is subject to publication. Moreover, since such an opinion by definition
dues not add or otherwise change the law, there is no real need or reason for either a
litigant or a judge to cite to it."); 1-langley, supra note 104, at 647 ("[AJ court can surely
decide what weight it wishes to give to the reasoning behind [a priori holding in a par-
ticular new factual context, rather than making the a priori judgment that nothing in
the holding could possibly be pertinent to any future case.").
135 See Letter front Seth P. Waxman to judge Will Garwood, supra note 4, at 5; see also
FED. R. APP. P. 32.1 (proposed) advisory committee's note.
136 The Reporter of the Appellate Rules Committee recently described unpublished
opinions as the "crazy uncle in the attic of the federal judiciary." Schiltz, supra note 6, at 72.
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tem must include exploration of the legal fiction upon which the
current system is based.'"
Judges cannot know at the time they render a decision, with
anything resembling certainty, whether their opinion has advanced
the development of the law or will never again interest anyone but
the parties to that case. That judgment is best made with the benefit
of time, and with input from lawyers, litigants, and other judges. The
legal community as a whole would be better served by a system of
decision-rendering reflecting that reality.
I" There is some question whether the rulemaking process is the appropriate forum
to resolve the underlying question of whether certain opinions can be deemed non-
precedential. I take no position on that issue here.
